Keywords
standard of proof
burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt
preponderance of the evidence
clear and convincing evidence
Abstract
In the study we addressed the issue of the standard of proof in the preliminary chamber. More specifically, we determined that although the path to a trial within a trial was opened, the legislature failed to prescribe a standard of proof. We agreed that a standard of proof was required and being inspired by the common law tradition, this should have been "clear and convincing evidence". In addition to the issue of the standard of proof in the preliminary chamber, we also dealt with the burden of proof, and we concluded it belongs to the State as long as they want to introduce to the trial the proof obtained during the criminal investigation phase. The State has the obligation to prove the proof was obtained in compliance with the principle of legality and loyalty.
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